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In a model with heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents facing margin constraints, we show how securities'
required returns are characterized both by their betas and their margin requirements. Negative shocks
to fundamentals make margin constraints bind, lowering risk-free rates and raising Sharpe ratios of
risky securities, especially for high-margin securities. Such a funding-liquidity crisis gives rise to "bases,"
that is, price gaps between securities with identical cash-flows but different margins. In the time series,
bases depend on the shadow cost of capital, which can be captured through the interest-rate spread
between collateralized and uncollateralized loans, and, in the cross section, they depend on relative
margins. We test the model empirically using the CDS-bond bases and other deviations from the Law
of One Price, and use it to evaluate central banks' lending facilities.
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lpederse@stern.nyu.eduThe paramount role of funding constraints becomes particularly salient during liquidity
crises, with the one that started in 2007 being an excellent case in point. Banks unable
to fund their operations closed down, and the funding problems spread to other investors,
such as hedge funds, that relied on bank funding. Therefore, traditional liquidity providers
became forced sellers, interest-rate spreads increased dramatically, Treasury rates dropped
sharply, and central banks stretched their balance sheets to facilitate funding. These funding
problems had signicant asset-pricing eects, the most extreme example being the failure of
the Law of One Price: securities with (nearly) identical cash ows traded at dierent prices,
giving rise to so-called \bases" (i.e., price gaps).
We attempt to explain these eects using a dynamic general-equilibrium model with re-
alistic margin constraints, and to empirically test the model's time-series and cross-sectional
predictions of how funding problems aect risk and return:
Our model shows that 1) the consumption CAPM is augmented by a security's margin
times the general funding cost; 2) a basis between a security and a derivative with identical
cash ows arises as the dierence in their margin requirements times the funding cost, plus
their endogenous dierence in beta; 3) securities with higher margins have larger betas and
volatilities during crises since they have larger funding liquidity risk; 4) the funding cost can
be captured by the interest-rate dierential between collateralized and uncollateralized bor-
rowing; 5) the margin eect strengthens non-linearly in \bad times" as margin requirements
are hit, leading to sharp drops in the risk-free collateralized and Treasury rates, to a rise
in the spread between collateralized and uncollateralized interest rates, and to a rise in risk
premia and especially margin premia; and 6) we calculate the equilibrium and calibrate the
magnitude and dynamics of the bases using macro parameters.
In our applications, we 7) nd statistically signicant empirical evidence consistent with
the model's predictions for the time-series of the CDS-bond basis, the cross-sectional dier-
ence between investment-grade and high-yield bases, and the risks of CDS vs. bonds and
the time-variation of these risks; 8) nd consistent evidence from the failure of the covered
interest rate parity; 9) compute the asset-pricing eect of the Fed's lending facilities; and 10)
quantify a bank's incentive to perform regulatory arbitrage to loosen capital requirements.
Our model considers a group of (relatively) risk-averse agents and a group of (relatively)
risk-tolerant agents. Each risk-tolerant investor uses leverage, but is subject to margin re-
quirements. He must fund all the margins on his positions with his equity capital and,
possibly, uncollateralized loans. One can think of these leveraged investors as banks or
the nancial sector more broadly, including hedge funds. The risk-averse investors may be
constrained in their trading of derivatives and cannot lend uncollateralized, so the uncollat-
eralized loan market is a pure \inter-bank market" for the risk-tolerant investors.
We rst show how margin requirements aect the required returns for both underlying
assets and derivatives.1 For a typical asset in which the risk-tolerant agents hold long
1If there were no redundant securities and margins were constant over time, the result for the underlying
assets would specialize a result in Cuoco (1997) for general convex portfolio constraints, and it is also closely
related to results in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Hindy and Huang (1995).




i  covariance risk premium + m
i  margin premium; (1)
where mi is the margin requirement (and all quantities may be time varying). The rst
two terms in this \margin CAPM" are the same as the standard (consumption) CAPM,
namely the risk-free interest rate and the covariance risk premium. Hence, if the margin
requirements are zero, our model naturally nests the standard model. With positive margin
requirements | as in the real world | a security's required returns is higher, the higher
its margin requirement. The margin premium is the shadow cost of funding for the risk-
tolerant agents multiplied by the relative importance of these agents. Consequently, it is
positive when margin constraints are binding, and zero otherwise. For instance, supposing
that in a crisis the risk-tolerant investors have a shadow cost of capital of 10% (consistent
with our estimates during the height of the Global Financial Crisis and with our calibration)
and the risk-tolerant investors account for 40% of the aggregate risk tolerance, the margin
premium is 4%. Therefore, if a security has a margin requirement of 50%, then its required
return is 4%  50% = 2% higher than the level predicted by the standard consumption
CAPM, a signicant eect.
Our model suggests that constrained investors would evaluate securities based on a ratio
that we call alpha per margin (AM):
AM
i =
E(ri)   rrisk-free   i  covariance risk premium
mi : (2)
This is the abnormal return (in excess of the risk-free rate and the standard risk adjustment)
on a strategy of investing a maximally leveraged dollar in the asset. Hence, the margin
CAPM in (1) can be stated equivalently by saying that, in equilibrium, all assets have the
same alpha-per-margin, AMi = margin premium. While in the classical CAPM alpha is
zero for all assets, in our model alphas can be non-zero when capital constraints bind, and
AM ratios are equalized as investors seek to maximize their leveraged return.
We show that \bad times" with binding margin constraints naturally occur after negative
shocks to fundamentals. This phenomenon leads to several intriguing eects. First, risk-free
interest rates for collateralized loans and Treasuries spike down. This happens because the
risk-tolerant agents cannot borrow as much as they would like due to margin constraints and,
therefore, in equilibrium the risk-averse agents must lend less than they otherwise would. In
order to induce the risk-averse agents not to lend, the interest rate must drop.
Further, in bad times the spread between the inter-bank uncollateralized loans and the
collateralized loans (or Treasuries) increases, even abstracting from credit risk. This liquidity-
driven interest-rate premium arises from the fact that the risk-averse investors do not partici-
pate in the uncollateralized inter-bank market. Since the risk-tolerant banks are constrained,
the inter-bank interest rate must be greater than the Treasury rate to reect the banks' pos-
itive shadow cost of capital. While this pure liquidity-driven interest-rate spread is zero in
\normal" times when margin requirements do not bind, it increases non-linearly following
negative shocks as when the crisis hit in 2007, as well as in previous liquidity crisis.
3Hence, the deviation from the standard CAPM is most apparent in \bad times," when
the funding-liquidity eects are the strongest. A stark illustration of this margin-based asset-
pricing eect is the price dierence between securities with the same cash ows but dierent
margin requirements. We show that the required return on a high-margin security | e.g., a
corporate bond | is greater than that of a low-margin security with the same cash ows |
e.g., proxied by a CDS. This is because of the high shadow cost of capital of the risk tolerant
investor. When the risk tolerant investor's margin constraint binds, he is willing to accept a
lower yield spread on a CDS since it uses less margin capital.
As empirical evidence of this prediction, we nd that the time-series variation of the CDS-
bond basis has a statistically signicant co-movement with the LIBOR-GC repo interest-rate
spread (i.e., the spread between uncollateralized and collateralized loans), as well as the
tightness of credit standards as estimated by the Federal Reserve Board's \Senior Loan
Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices."
The model predicts that the magnitude of the basis is the shadow cost of capital times
the margin dierence plus the dierence in betas. To understand this predicted magnitude,
consider the CDS-bond basis, that is, the yield dierence between a corporate bond and a
comparable derivative. With a shadow cost of capital of 10% during the crisis, a margin
on investment grade bonds of 25%, and a margin on the corresponding CDS of 5%, the
direct eect of the margin dierence on the basis is 10%  (25%   5%) = 2%, close to what
was observed empirically. Additionally, the model predicts that the corporate bond's higher
margin makes it riskier since it is more sensitive to further funding crisis, leading to an
additional, albeit smaller, eect on the basis.
When there are several pairs of underlying/derivative securities, each of which having an
associated basis, our model predicts that these bases are correlated in the time series due
to their common dependence on the shadow cost of capital, and, cross-sectionally, the bases
should be proportional to each pair's dierence in margin requirements.
To test these cross-sectional predictions empirically, we compare the basis of investment-
grade (IG) bonds with the basis for high-yield (HY) bonds and nd that they move closely
together and that the dierence in their magnitudes corresponds to the dierence in their
margins, consistent with our model's prediction. Indeed, the margin dierence between HY
bonds and CDS is about twice that of IG bonds/CDS, so the model predicts a HY basis
eect that is about twice the IG basis, consistent with the data.
Interestingly, the model also implies that securities with identical cash ows but dierent
margins have dierent risk characteristics due to their dierent exposures to funding-liquidity
risk. The low-margin CDS has less systematic risk since its price drops less in liquidity
crisis, and, therefore, its required return is lower even before the margin constraint binds.
Consistent with the model, we nd empirically that bonds and CDS have similar betas and
volatilities during \normal" times when constraints are not near being binding, but that
betas and volatilities of high-margin bonds rise above those of CDSs during the 2007-2009
liquidity crisis.
Further consistent evidence arises from the related time-series variation of the interest-
rate spread and that of the deviation from the covered interest parity (CIP). Indeed, during
4the funding crises of 1998 and 2007-2009, when margins are likely to have been binding,
interest-rate spreads were wide and the CIP deviation was substantial since agents did not
have enough capital to eliminate it.
As another application of the model, we show how the Fed's lending facilities aect asset
prices, providing new insights on the monetary transmission mechanism during liquidity.
We discuss how the lending facilities lower margin requirements, and show that the model-
implied increase in asset prices is of the same order of magnitude as the increase attributable
to lowered margins in the banks' bid prices, according to surveys conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
Further, we derive the shadow cost of banks' regulatory-capital requirements, which gives
an estimate of their incentive to perform regulatory arbitrage by placing assets o the balance
sheet or tilting towards AAA securities with low capital requirements.
The paper is related to a number of strands of literature. Borrowing constraints con-
fer assets a collateral value (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Hindy (1995), Detemple and
Murthy (1997), Geanakoplos (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2001), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Coen-Pirani (2005), and Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2008)) and constraints open the possibility of arbitrage in equilibrium (Basak
and Croitoru (2000, 2006) and Geanakoplos (2003)). We focus on margin requirements,
which are linked to market liquidity and volatility (Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunner-
meier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009), Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009),
and Rytchkov (2009)), and provide analytic asset-pricing eects. Asset prices also depend
on market liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Longsta (2004), Due, G^ arleanu,
and Pedersen (2007), and G^ arleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009)), market liquidity risk
(Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), and He and Krishna-
murthy (2008)), limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), banking frictions (Allen and
Gale (1998, 2004, 2005), Acharya and Viswanathan (2010)), and related corporate-nance
issues (Holmstr om and Tirole (1998, 2001)). We use the methods for analyzing equilibria
in continuous-time models with constraints of Cuoco (1997); other related applications are
provided by Li (2008), Rytchkov (2009), Chabakauri (2010), and Prieto (2010).2
The specication of the margin requirement is key to our results. First, we make the
realistic assumption that both long and short positions use capital; in contrast, a linear
constraint, as often assumed in the literature, implies that shorting frees up capital. While
bases with natural properties arise in our model, we show that no basis can obtain in a world
in which all agents face only the same linear constraint. Second, we consider assets with
identical cash ows and dierent margin requirements, while margins for such assets would be
the same if margins arose solely from limited commitment (Geanakoplos (1997)). In the real
world, securities with (almost) identical cash ows can have substantially dierent margins,
since margins depend on the market liquidity of the securities (Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009)) and because of various institutional frictions. For instance, corporate bonds have low
2Numerous papers study frictionless heterogeneous-agent economies, e.g., Dumas (1989), Wang (1996),
Chan and Kogan (2002), Bhamra and Uppal (2007), Weinbaum (2009), G^ arleanu and Panageas (2008), and
Longsta and Wang (2009).
5market liquidity in over-the-counter search markets (Due, G^ arleanu, and Pedersen (2005,
2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008)) and this makes them less attractive as collateral since they
can be dicult to sell. Further, to get credit exposure through a corporate bond, one must
actually buy the bond for cash and try to fund it using a repo, which uses a broker's balance
sheet, while a CDS is an \unfunded" derivative with zero net present value, so the margin is
only necessary to limit counterparty risk; the CDS does not inherently use cash. Our model
further allows for time-varying margins, given that margins tend to increase during crises
due to a margin spiral as explained by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and documented
empirically by Gorton and Metrick (2009a, 2009b).
We complement the literature by providing a tractable model with explicit pricing equa-
tions that provide testable time-series and cross-sectional implications, deriving the basis
(i.e., price gap) between securities with identical cashows depending on their dierent mar-
gins, showing how the shadow cost of funding can be captured using interest-rate spreads,
calibrating the magnitude and dynamics of the predicted deviations from the Law of One
Price using realistic parameters, testing the theory empirically using the CDS-bond basis
and the failure of the CIP, and applying the theory to the Federal Reserve's lending facilities
and the incentive to perform regulatory arbitrage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out the model, Section 2
derives our main theoretical results and calibrates the model, and Section 3 applies the model
empirically to the CDS-bond basis, the failure of the covered interest rate parity, and the
pricing of the Fed's lending facilities, and quanties the cost of banks' regulatory capital
requirements. Section 4 concludes.
1 Model
We consider a continuous-time economy in which several risky assets are traded. Each asset
i pays a dividend i
t at time t and is available in a supply normalized to 1. The dividend of
















t is the dividend growth and the dividend volatility is given by the vector i
t of
loadings on the Brownian motion.
Each security is further characterized by its margin (also called a haircut) mi
t 2 [0;1], an
It^ o process, measured as a fraction of the investment that must be nanced by an agent's
own capital as discussed below. For instance, the margin on a corporate bond could be
mbond
t = 50%, meaning that an agent can borrow half of the value and must pay the other
half using his own capital.
3All random variables are dened on a probability space (
;F) and all processes are measurable with
respect to the augmented ltration Fw
t generated by w.
6In addition to these \underlying assets" in positive supply, the economy has a number
of \derivatives" in zero net supply. Each derivative i0 has the same cash ows i
t as some
underlying security i, but with a lower margin requirement: mi0
t < mi
t.
We assume that the prices of underlying assets and derivatives are It^ o processes with
expected return (including dividends) denoted i
t and volatility vectors i
t, which are linearly














Finally, the set of securities includes two riskless money-market assets, one for collater-
alized loans and one for uncollateralized loans as explained further below. The equilibrium
interest rate for collateralized loans is rc
t and for uncollateralized loans is ru
t .
The economy is populated by two agents: agent a is averse to risk, whereas b is braver.







where ua(C) = 1
1 aC1 a with relative risk aversion a > 1, and ub(C) = log(C) with
relative risk aversion b = 1. We can think of agent a as a representative pension fund or
risk-averse private (retail) investor, and of agent b as representing more risk-tolerant investors
using leverage such as banks or hedge funds.
At any time t, each agent g 2 fa;bg must choose his consumption, C
g
t | we omit the
superscript g when there is little risk of confusion | the proportion i
t of his wealth Wt that
he invests in risky asset i, and the proportion u
t invested in the uncollateralized loans; the
rest is invested in collateralized loans. The agent must keep his wealth positive, Wt  0, and


































where the summation is done over all risky underlying and derivative securities.








u  1: (7)
In words, an agent can tie up his capital in margin for long or short positions in risky assets
and invest in uncollateralized loans (or borrow uncollateralized if u < 0), and these capital
uses, measured in proportion of wealth, must be less than 100% of the wealth. The rest of
the wealth, as well as the money in margin accounts, earn the collateralized interest rate.4
4Alternatively, the constraint can be written as
X
i




7This key constraint is a main driver of our results. The literature often assumes a linear
margin constraint (i.e., without the absolute-value operator), but Appendix A shows that
deviations from the Law of One Price cannot arise in this case. Our constraint captures
well the problem facing any real-world investor (e.g., real-world investors cannot nance
unlimited long positions by short ones as is implied by the linear constraint) and it gives rise
to deviations from the Law of One Price that match those observed empirically.
In addition, the risk-averse agent a does not participate in the markets for uncollateralized
loans and may be allowed only limited positions in derivatives. That is, he must choose
u = 0 and i0 2 Ai0 for every derivative i0, where the admissible set Ai0 can, for instance, be
specied as Ai0 = f0g, meaning that he cannot trade derivatives, or as Ai0 = [A;A], meaning
that he can only trade a limited amount. This captures the fact that certain agents are often
limited both by risk aversion and a lack of willingness to participate in some transactions,
e.g., those with apparent operational risk | i.e., the risk that something unspecied can go
wrong | and by a lack of expertise. Also, this means that the uncollateralized market may
capture an inter-bank loan market.
Our notion of equilibrium is standard. It is a collection of prices, consumption plans,
and positions, such that (i) each agent maximizes his utility given the prices and subject to
his investment constraints; (ii) the markets for risky and risk-free assets clear.
2 Margin-Based Asset Prices
We are interested in the properties of the equilibrium and consider rst the optimization
problem of the brave agent b using dynamic programming. The logarithmic utility for con-















































Attaching a Lagrange multiplier   to the margin constraint, the rst-order condition
with respect to the uncollateralized investment or loan u yields the following result:
Proposition 1 (Interest-Rate Spread) The interest-rate dierential between uncollater-
alized and collateralized loans captures the risk tolerant agent's shadow cost of an extra dollar
of funding, ru
t   rc
t =  t.
For a long position, li is the proportion of the security value that can be borrowed in the collateralized
lending market (e.g., the repo market). Hence, the left-hand-side of the equation is the fraction of wealth
i used to buy the security, and the right-hand-side is the total wealth 1 plus the borrowed amount ili.
Naturally, the margin mi = 1   li is the fraction of the security value that cannot be borrowed against.
For a short position, one must rst borrow the security and post cash collateral of (1 + mi)i and, since
the short sale raises i, the net capital use is mii. Derivatives with zero net present value have margin
requirements too. See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for details.
8The proposition identies the shadow cost of capital, central to our asset-pricing analysis, as
the interest-rate dierential between uncollateralized loans, which do not use up a borrower's
potentially scarce collateral, and collateralized loans, which do. In addition to having intu-
itive appeal, this relationship is valuable for linking the unobserved shadow cost of capital
  to quantities in principle observable; we use it in our empirical analysis.
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t 2 [ 1;1] if i = 0;
(9)











denote the conditional covariance between agent b's consumption growth and the return on
security i. These rst-order conditions mean that a security's expected excess return i
t  rc
t
depends on its margin mi
t, the risk tolerant agent's shadow cost of funding  t, and the
security's covariance with the risk tolerant agent's consumption growth.
To characterize the way in which returns depend on aggregate consumption (which is
easier to observe empirically), we also need to consider agent a's optimal policy and aggregate
across agents.5 If a's margin requirement does not bind, standard arguments show that the
underlying securities are priced by his consumption, i   rc = aCa;i, but the general
problem with margin constraints and spanned securities is more complex. In the general
case, we derive a consumption CAPM (CCAPM) depending on aggregate consumption in
the appendix. For this, we rst introduce some notation: 
C;i
t is the covariance of the growth












































5See Proposition 3 in Cuoco (1997) for a CAPM relation for general time-invariant convex portfolio
constraints in the absence of redundant securities.
9We recall that   is agent b's shadow cost of funding. With these denitions, we are ready to
state the margin-adjusted CCAPM and CAPM. For simplicity, we do it under the natural
assumption that the margin constraint of the risk-averse agent a does not bind.6
Proposition 2 (Margin CCAPM) The expected excess return i
t   rc
t on an underlying








t + xt t m
i
t (14)





t  xt t mi
t, while if b has a zero position the required return lies between the two values.
This proposition relates excess returns to the covariance between aggregate consumption
growth and a security's returns, as well as to the funding constraints. The covariance term
is the same as in the classic CCAPM model of Breeden (1979). The dierence is the funding
term, which is the product of the security-specic margin mi
t and the general coecients  t
and xt that measure the tightness of the margin constraints. Naturally, the tightness of the
margin constraint depends on the leveraged risk-tolerant agent's shadow cost of funding,  ,
and the relative importance of this agent, x.
The margin-CCAPM's economic foundation dictates the magnitude of the coecients.
Since b = 1 and a is a number between 1 and 10, say, the aggregate risk aversion t is
somewhere between 1 and 10, and varies over time depending on the agents' relative wealths.
The relative importance x of agent b is a number between 0 and 1. While this risk-tolerant
agent might be a small part of the economy in terms of total consumption or wealth, his
risk tolerance is larger, which raises his importance. For instance, even if we think that
he accounts only for as little as 2% of the aggregate consumption, and if agent a has a
risk aversion of 10, then x is around 17%, close to 10 times the consumption share. The
shadow cost   can be as much as 10% in our calibration and empirical analysis. Hence,
for a security with a 50% margin, the funding term would raise the required return by
17%  10%  50%  1% in this case.
For a dierent way to interpret relationship (14), consider the \alpha" of asset i, that is,





t . The Margin CCAPM says
that alphas are proportional to margin requirements,  xtmi
t, or, if we introduce the ratio
alpha per margin (AM), it says that AMi is constant across securities i,
AM
i
t = xt t:
For instance, if a security has a margin requirement of 10%, it can be leveraged 10-to-1. In
this case, AMi = 10   must equal the aggregate shadow cost of capital xt t to make it
worthwhile for the agents to use margin equity to hold this security.
6We state and prove the propositions without this assumption in the appendix, but focus on this case
because it is natural, simpler to state, and obtains in our calibrated equilibrium in Section 2.1. In the general
case, (B.1) contains the additional term that captures a's margin constraint, +(1   xt)   t, where   t is a's
shadow cost of capital, and similarly for (16).
10The CAPM can also be written in terms of a mimicking portfolio in place of the aggre-
gate consumption. Specically, let q be the portfolio whose return has the highest possible
(instantaneous) correlation with aggregate consumption growth and qi
t be the weight of asset
















Proposition 3 (Margin CAPM) Suppose that the margin constraint of agent a does not
bind. The expected excess return i
t   rc









t + xt t m
i
t; (16)






t   xt t mi
t, and otherwise the required return lies between the two values.
We next turn to the basis between underlying securities and derivatives. The optimization
problem of the brave agent b implies the following relation for the basis.
Proposition 4 (Basis) A basis arises when b's margin constraint binds and a's derivative-
trading constraint or margin constraint binds. Depending on the constraints, the basis is
inuenced by the dierence or sum of margins:
(A. Levered Investor Causing Basis) Suppose that agent b is long security i and long
derivative i0. Then the required return spread i
t   i0
t between security i and derivative i0
(the \basis") depends on the shadow cost of capital  , the securities' dierence in margins,
mi
t   mi0














































This proposition provides useful intuition about the drivers of a basis. Since a non-zero
basis constitutes a failure of the Law of One Price, all agents must be constrained for this to
happen in equilibrium. Such a situation obtains when the risk-tolerant agent b is constrained
by his leverage and agent a is constrained by his limited ability to hold derivatives.
If the risk-averse investor can short only a limited amount of derivatives, then case A in
the proposition arises. In this case, the risk-tolerant investor b wants to go long both the
underlying and the derivative to earn the associated risk premium. He can get exposure
to the derivative with less use of margin, and, therefore, he is willing to accept a smaller
return premium on the derivative. In fact, the basis as measured by the return spread is
11the dierence in margins multiplied by the shadow cost of capital, adjusted for the beta
dierence.
The second case obtains, for instance, if agent a has a structural need | for some
institutional reason | to hold a long position in the derivative, i.e., Ai0 = fAi0g, where
Ai0 > 0. This creates a demand pressure on the derivative, and, in equilibrium, agent b will
do a basis trade, that is, shortsell the derivative and go long the underlying. The basis trade
uses margin on both the long and the short side, and therefore the basis depends on the sum
of the margins mi
t + mi0
t times the shadow cost of capital.
Proposition 4 provides natural empirical predictions that we consider in Section 3: First,
the basis varies in the time series with the scarcity of funding  , which is related to the
interest-rate spread (Proposition 1). Second, the basis varies with margins in the cross-
section of bases for the various security/derivative pairs.
It is interesting that the returns of the underlying security and its derivative may have
dierent sensitivities to underlying shocks and, therefore, can have dierent covariances with
the brave agent's consumption. The dierent sensitivities to funding shocks are due to their
dierent margin requirements. In particular, if a security has a lower margin requirement,
then it is less sensitive to a funding crisis where margin constraints become binding, and it
therefore has a lower Cb;i0, as our calibrated example in Section 2.2 illustrates.
Since margins do aect betas in general, however, it is not immediate from Proposition 4
that higher margins increase the required return and, hence, lower prices. It is nevertheless
the case that higher margin requirements translate into lower prices under certain conditions,
as we show next.








The inequality is strict if the margin constraint binds with positive probability after time t.
This result follows from the fact that the price of a security can be expressed as the sum
of its cashows discounted using an agent's marginal utility, and its collateral value, which
depends monotonically on m. Another way to see this result is to express the price as the
discounted sum of all future cashows, where the discount factor depends both on the
marginal utility and on margins (times the shadow cost of capital), so that higher margins
imply a larger discount rate.
2.1 Calculating the Equilibrium with Many Assets
We next consider a simplied economy in which we can compute the equilibrium directly.
This provides further intuition and allows us to calibrate the economy using realistic macroe-
conomic parameters. The economy has a continuum of assets, each available in an innites-
imal net supply of 1. The dividend paid by asset i is given by a share si of the aggregate
dividend, i = siC, with
dCt = 











12where the standard Brownian motions w and wi are independent. The dividend share is
initiated at si
0 = 1 and it is a martingale since its drift is zero. We appeal informally to the
Law of Large Numbers (LLN) to state Et[si
v ji 2 I] = 1, 8v  t  0 and for any interval
I  [0;1]. In particular, the aggregate dividend naturally equals E[i
tjCt] = Ct. All the
underlying assets have the same margin requirement mi = m, and there are derivatives in
zero net supply with dierent margins mi0  m as before. The averse agent a's derivative-
trading constraint is simple: he cannot participate in any derivative market.
The LLN implies that the idiosyncratic factors si are not priced and, therefore, the price
of any underlying security i is P i = siP, where P is the price of the market, which is the
same as in an economy with a single asset paying dividend C and having margin m. We
therefore concentrate on pricing this market asset.
To calculate an equilibrium, we use the fact that agent b's consumption is his discount
rate  times his wealth, Cb = W b (as is well-known for log-utility agents). This means
that agent b's consumption as a fraction of the total consumption, cb = Cb=C, characterizes
the wealth distribution and becomes a convenient state variable to keep track of. Further,
\level" variables are linear in the aggregate consumption C since it is a geometric Brownian
motion and utilities are isoelastic. Hence, we are looking for an equilibrium in which the
state is summarized by (C;cb), where stock prices and wealths scale linearly with C for
xed cb, while interest rates, Sharpe ratios, and volatilities depend only on cb, and assume
throughout that such an equilibrium exists.
The market price is of the form Pt = (cb
t)Ct, where the price-dividend ratio () is a
function that we need to determine as the solution to a dierential equation. We provide
the details of the analysis in the appendix, and collect the main results in the following
proposition, including the dierential equation for . To state the proposition, we use the
representative agent's risk aversion t and agent b's relative importance xt given above in
(12){(13), as well as the additional denitions
  = 
C (19)




(    
C): (20)
As is clear from the proposition,   is the market Sharpe ratio without margin constraints
and   is the return volatility without margin constraints for the same values of cb and ().7
Proposition 6 (Calculating Equilibrium) The margin constraint binds if and only if
 
  > 1
m or, equivalently, if and only if 
 > 1
m. The market Sharpe ratio,  
 rc
 , and the
return volatility, , are given by






























7Note, however, that in an economy without margins cb
t has a dierent distribution for given time-0
endowments and the function  is dierent.


























Finally, the price-to-dividend ratio (cb) solves the ordinary dierential equation








































This proposition oers a number of interesting insights in addition to illustrating the
derivation of equilibrium. First, to understand when the margin constraint binds, consider




in the risky asset, but, since he faces a margin of m, he can at most lever up to 1
m. Hence,
he is constrained if 
 > 1
m. The margin constraint changes the equilibrium Sharpe ratio
 and volatility , but, nevertheless, the states of nature with binding margin constraints
can be determined simply by looking at whether the agent would be constrained when the
Sharpe ratio   and volatility   are computed without margins (given the actual state cb and
equilibrium valuation ratio ), i.e.,  
  > 1
m.
Importantly, Equation (21) shows that, for a given value cb, the market Sharpe ratio 
is higher when the constraint binds. This is intuitive because the constraint prevents the
optimal sharing of risk, meaning that the risk-averse agent a has to be induced, via a higher
reward for risk, to take on more risk than he would absent constraints.
Equation (22), on the other hand, suggests that the volatility decreases with the intro-
duction of constraints, as long as the price-to-dividend ratio increases with the importance
of agent b.8 The explanation of the result lies in the fact that, when the constraint binds,
agent b takes less risk than he would otherwise, which makes cb, and consequently the P/D
ratio , less volatile.






+ between the unconstrained and the constrained optima, which
increases with the severity m of the margin constraint. On the other hand, a higher m
means that each dollar can be leveraged less, reducing the shadow cost of capital. The
overall eect of m on   is non-monotonic.
In our calibration, we solve for the function  numerically, using as boundary conditions
the price-to-dividend ratios that obtain in one-agent models with cb = 0 and cb = 1. Once the
8Since agent b is the less risk averse, this property is intuitively appealing, but does not obtain generally
because of the non-monotonic eect of aggregate risk aversion (in a CRRA world) on the interest rate.
14equilibrium price dynamics for the market and the collateralized-loan rate are thus computed,
we calculate the value of the Lagrange multiplier   from (24) and the uncollateralized interest
rate ru then follows immediately from Proposition 1, ru = rc +  . The price of a derivative
i0, P i0
t = i0(cb
t)Ct, is calculated by solving a linear ODE for its price-dividend ratio i0:
Proposition 7 The price-to-dividend ratio i0(cb) for derivative i0 solves the dierential
equation






































While the general case can only be solved numerically, explicit expressions for the prices
of the underlying assets and agent b's shadow cost of capital   are available in a particular
limit case.
Proposition 8 (Limit Prices and Shadow Cost of Capital) In the limit as the rela-




 + (a   1)C   1
2a(a   1)(C)
2: (27)












We can further characterize the basis in the limit:
Proposition 9 (Limit Basis) In the limit as the relative wealth of agent b approaches 0,
















if he is long/short the underlying and the derivative.
This proposition provides a natural benchmark for the basis, namely a product of the shadow
cost of capital | which is common for all basis trades | and the margin use, which is either
the dierence or the sum of margins. In the real world, pairs of underlying and derivative
securities with large margins mi + mi0 also tend to have large margin spreads mi   mi0, so
testing the proposition does not rely heavily on knowing whether (29) or (30) applies. In
the empirical section, we compare the basis per margin use for investment grade CDS-bond
basis with the high-yield CDS-bond basis, relying on the prediction
i   i0
mi   mi0 =
j   j0
mj   mj0: (31)
15C C a  m mmedium mlow
0.03 0.08 8 0.02 0.4 0.3 0.1
Table 1: Parameters used in calibration
2.2 Calibration
We present here a set of quantitative results based on the solution of the model described
above and the parameters in Table 1. An advantage of our model is that all the parameters
are easy to relate to real-world quantities so the interpretation of our assumptions and results
is clear.
The aggregate-consumption mean growth C and its volatility C are chosen between
those of actual consumption growth and those of actual dividend growth, since the literature
uses these benchmarks. The risk aversion a = 8 of agent a is chosen at the high end of
what the literature typically views as the \reasonable" range between 1 and 10, since agent
a is the more risk averse agent, and the discount rate  is also at a conventional level. The
margin of each underlying asset m is 40%, and we consider a low-margin derivative with
margin mlow = 10%, a medium-margin derivative with mmedium = 30%, and a derivative
with a margin that varies randomly between 10% and 30% depending on the state of the
economy as described below.
Figures 1{4 show dierent key properties of the model as functions of the economy's
state variable, namely the proportion of consumption accruing to agent b. Since agent b
is less risk averse, he is more heavily invested in the risky asset and therefore loses more
following a series of bad shocks. Thus, the states in which cb is small are states with \bad"
fundamentals.
It is apparent in all three gures that the margin constraint binds if and only if cb is low
enough, more precisely when cb is lower than 0.22. The property is natural: when agent b
is poor his margin constraint is more binding and his shadow cost of capital is larger. This
is because agent a becomes a larger part of the market, which increases the market price of
risk, and therefore increases the desired leverage of agent b.
Figure 1 shows three interest rates: the interest rate obtaining in the absence of con-
straints, and the collateralized and uncollateralized rates obtaining with constraints. As is
seen in the gure, the collateralized interest rate (solid line) can be substantially lower than
the complete-market rate in the bad states, while the uncollateralized rate can be extremely
high, indicating the high value of capital to agent b. The dierence between these rates is
the shadow cost of capital, which can get close to 10% as in the data that we present in the
next section.
Figure 2 plots the return spreads between the underlying security and two derivatives.
The derivatives are distinguished by their dierent margin requirements: one has an inter-
mediate margin requirement mmedium = 30% | lower than the margin requirement of the
underlying asset, m = 40%, but not as low as the margin requirement on the other deriva-
tive, which is mlow = 10%. We see that the required return spread (or basis) can be up
16to 1% and 3%, respectively, for the two derivatives, a similar magnitude to the empirically
observed bases, and vary depending on the severity of the crisis as captured by a low cb.
As predicted by the limit result (29), which can be viewed as an approximation, the return
spread is roughly three times higher for the low-margin derivative than for the intermediate-
margin derivative due to its three times larger margin spread, (m mlow)=(m mmedium) = 3.
Another interesting feature of this gure is that the return spread is signicantly above
zero even in states where the constraint does not bind (cb > 0:22). The explanation for
this outcome lies with the securities' dierent betas. Indeed, low-margin securities have
a lower loading on the aggregate risk, Cb;low < Cb;medium < Cb;high. This is because
negative fundamental shocks lead to tightening of margin requirements, thus increasing the
margin-based return premium, which leads to larger price drops for high-margin securities.
It is noteworthy that this phenomenon amplies the return spread and kicks in even before
margin constraints bind.
Similarly, lower-margin securities have lower volatilities9 because they are less exposed to
changes in the shadow cost of capital, i.e., they have less liquidity risk. The ratio of the risk
(beta or volatility) of low-margin securities to high-margin securities is U-shaped. When
constraints are far from binding (large cb), margins have little eect on returns, and the
risks of high- and low-margin securities are similar. For lower values of cb where constraints
become binding, the risk dierence becomes signicant, but it eventually goes down as b-
agents are wiped out (cb close to zero).
In addition, the dependence of the sensitivity to aggregate risk on the margin size also
implies that, once the idiosyncratic components si are taken into account, the returns on
low-margin securities are less highly correlated than those on high-margin securities, all else
equal. Furthermore, the bases between underlying-derivative pairs, driven largely by the
common shadow cost of capital, are more correlated with each other than the underlying
securities are.
Figure 3 plots the Sharpe Ratios (SR) of the underlying in an alternative economy with
no margin constraints, the underlying when there exist margin constraints, and of the two
derivatives. We see that the Sharpe ratio of the underlying is higher with the constraint
than without it to compensate for the cost of margin use. The SR of the derivatives is lower
than that of the underlying due to their lower margins.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the price premium of derivatives above the price of the underly-
ing, P derivative=P high   1. We consider this quantity both for the low- and medium-margin
derivatives, as well as for a varying-margin derivative. The margin of the latter is 10% in
\good states," where cb  0:15, and increases to 30% in \bad states", where cb < 0:15.
The price premia can be very large, especially for low-margin securities in bad states of the
economy. Interestingly, the price premia are signicant even when the margin constraints are
not binding or even close to being binding. This is because the price reects the possibility
of future binding margin constraints, and puts a premium on securities with low margins
9In various calibrations, we found that higher-margin securities have larger betas and volatilities. We can
show this result in general using Malliavin-calculus techniques, provided that the ratio  =cb decreases with
cb. While this ratio clearly decreases at both cb = 0 and cb = supfc
   (c) > 0g, i.e., where the constraint
just binds, we could not prove that it does everywhere.
17in such states of nature. Since the random-margin security has a high margin in the worst
states, it is priced similarly to the high-margin security even when its margin is low.
Another way of looking at the price level is to consider how the price-dividend ratio
depends on the state of the economy cb. Our calibration yields the natural outcome, also
discussed above in footnote 8, that the price-dividend ratio  is increasing in cb, i.e., higher
valuation ratios obtain in good times. (We omit the graph for brevity.) Conversely, the
dividend yield (the reciprocal of the price-dividend ratio) is lower in good times. In the
empirical Section 3.1 below we show that the dividend yield in the stock market is linked to
the CDS-bond basis, consistent with both depending on how constrained the economy is.
3 Empirical Applications
This section applies our model to the CDS-bond basis, the failure of the covered-interest
rate parity, the pricing of the Fed's lending facilities, and to quantify the cost of capital
requirements.
3.1 The CDS-Bond Basis
The CDS-bond basis is a measure of the price discrepancy between securities with nearly
identical economic exposures, namely corporate bonds and credit default swaps (CDS). Said
simply, the CDS-bond basis is what one can earn by buying a corporate bond and a CDS
that protects against default on the bond.10 Since this package in principle has no risk if
one can hold to maturity (though there are certain risks in the real world), the basis reects
a deviation from the Law of One Price. However, to earn an arbitrage prot one must use
capital, and during a funding crisis capital is required to earn excess returns for constrained
investors, so this is consistent with our margin-based asset pricing.
Another way of stating the apparent puzzle is to note that the yield spread on a corporate
bond is higher than the CDS spread. According to our model, this is because agents can
get credit exposure with less use of margin capital through CDS and, therefore, they are
willing to earn a smaller expected return per notional, but a similar return per use of margin
capital.
To understand the dierence in margin requirements of corporate bonds and CDS, con-
sider a hedge fund that buys a corporate bond. It must naturally use capital to pay the
bond's price. The hedge fund can borrow using the bond as collateral, but this uses the
hedge fund's broker's balance sheet. In light of our model, all capital use by risk-tolerant
agents is costly, so the question is whether the broker can in turn borrow against the bond
from an unconstrained agent such a cash-rich commercial bank. This can be done only to
a limited extent if the commercial bank does not have experience trading such bonds, since
corporate bonds are illiquid, making the evaluation of their value and risk potentially dif-
10Sometimes the CDS-bond basis is reported with the opposite sign. For simplicity, we use a convention
that implies a positive basis during the crisis that started in 2007.
18cult. Importantly, the bond's market illiquidity also means that it can be dicult, time
consuming, and costly to sell the bond during times of stress.
A CDS, on the other hand, is a derivative with zero present value so it does not inherently
use capital. A hedge fund entering into a CDS must nevertheless post margin to limit
the counterparty risk of the contract. Since the CDS margin mostly reects the economic
counterparty risk, whereas the corporate-bond margin additionally reects its inherent cash
usage and market illiquidity, the corporate-bond margin is larger than the CDS margin. In
short, margins on \funded" underlying assets such as corporate bonds are larger than those
of \unfunded" derivatives.
We test the model's predictions for (i) the time-series of the deviation from the Law
of One Price (LoOP); (ii) the cross-section of the LoOP deviations for dierent pairs of
CDS/bond; and (iii) the time-series and cross-section of the risk (measured as volatility and
beta) of the CDS's and bonds. We rst describe the data.
Data
We use data on the returns of the CDX index and S&P500 from Bloomberg, the Merrill
Lynch intermediate corporate return indices in excess of the same-maturity swaps from
Merrill Lynch, the CDS-bond basis from a major broker-dealer, LIBOR and GC-repo rates
from Bloomberg, and the average dividend yield of U.S. stocks from MSCI. Further, we use
the Federal Reserve Board's survey, \Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices," focusing on the net percent of respondents tightening their credit standards.
Testing the Model's Time-Series LoOP Predictions
To consider our model's time-series predictions, Figure 5 shows the average CDS-bond
basis for high-grade bonds, the spread between the 3-month uncollateralized LIBOR loans
and 3-month general collateral (GC) repo rate, and the Fed's survey measure of tightening
credit standards.
We see that tighter credit standards (possibly reecting more binding margin constraints)
are associated with higher interest-rate spreads and a widening of the basis, consistent with
our model's predictions. The link between the interest-rate spread and the basis, in particu-
lar, is related to Propositions 4 and 9 that describe the dependence of the basis on the shadow
cost of capital and Proposition 1 linking the cost of capital to the interest-rate spread.
We test these predictions more formally in Table 2. In particular, Panel A reports
time-series regressions of the CDS-bond basis on, respectively, the TED spread, the credit
standards, and the average dividend yield of U.S. stocks. The dividend yield is the dividend
of stocks, divided by their price, and it can be viewed as a measure of required returns.
Specically, in our calibration in Section 2.2, a high dividend is associated with a poor state
of the economy where constraints are binding and deviations of the LoOP occur. We include
the dividend yield to address an additional prediction of the model, namely that the funding
frictions aect required returns broadly, including in the stock markets.
19We run these univariate regression both for the average basis among investment-grade
(IG) securities and among high-yield (HY) securities. We see that both the IG and HY bases
load signicantly on the rst two measures of funding illiquidity as well as on the dividend
yield, as predicted by the model. The credit standard has an R2 as high as 75% for IG and
67% for HY, and the dividend yield has the highest R2, in excess of 80% for both IG and
HY. While consistent with the model, it is surprising that the deviations from the Law of
One Price in the credit markets appear so closely linked not only to the funding markets,
but even to the stock market.
While these results formalize the connection between the bases and the funding measures
that is visually clear in Figure 5, there can be severe biases in connection with regressions
of persistence variables such as these. Running the regression in changes has better small-
sample properties as changes are more stationary and, eectively, the sample has more
independent observations. Panel B of Table 2 reports the regressions in changes. To account
for the potential bias due to non-synchronous trading (i.e., stale prices) in the monthly
regression of changes,11 we include a lagged value of the explanatory variable (following
Dimson (1979) and many others),
basist =  + 1xt + 2xt 1 + "t:
We then report the biased-adjusted slope coecient 1 + 2 and its t-statistic, estimated
using the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of (1;2). We see that the coecients
remain highly signicant for all the explanatory variables and for both the IG and HY bases.
The changes of the explanatory variables continue to have a high degree of explanatory power
with R2's ranging from 23% to 47%.
The model's prediction regarding the relation between the magnitude of the interest-
rate spread and the magnitude of the basis is rejected in the data, if LIBOR is the true
uncollateralized interest rate. Proposition 9 predicts that the basis is the shadow cost of
capital multiplied by a number less than 1, and Proposition 1 that the shadow cost of capital
is equal to the interest-rate spread. However, the basis is in fact higher than the interest-rate
spread at the end of the sample. This happens, most likely, because the nancial institutions'
shadow cost of capital is larger than the LIBOR spread, for a couple of reasons: the Fed
keeps the LIBOR down (see next section), many arbitrageurs (e.g., hedge funds) cannot
borrow at LIBOR, and even those that can borrow at LIBOR cannot use a LIBOR loan to
increase their trading, as they must limit their leverage.
Testing the Model's Cross-Sectional LoOP Predictions
We next test the model's cross-sectional predictions for the deviation from the LoOP.
For this, we compare the basis of investment-grade (IG) bonds with that of high-yield (HY)
bonds as seen in Figure 6. To facilitate the comparison in light of our model, we adjust
the bases for their relative margin spreads. Since IG corporate bonds have a margin around
11As is standard, we do not add a lagged variable in regressions in levels since this introduces co-linearity
problems and non-synchronous trading has little eect on the regression in levels.
2025% and IG CDS have margins around 5%, the IG margin dierential is 20%. Hence, the
adjusted IG basis is basis/0.20. Similarly, we estimate that the HY margin dierential is
around 50% so the HY adjusted basis is basis/0.50. These margin rates are based on a
broker's estimates and the estimate is subject to a substantial amount of uncertainty since
margins are opaque and vary between brokers and clients and over time. Propositions 4 and
9 predict that the bases adjusted for margin in this way should line up in the cross section
so that the expected prot per margin use is constant in the cross section. Figure 6 shows
that the adjusted bases track each other quite closely.
We test the statistical signicance of this cross-sectional relation in Table 3. Panel A
shows the regression of the HY basis on the IG basis, both in levels and changes. For the
change regression, we adjust for non-synchronous prices as described above, and have the
IG basis on the right-hand side as it is based on the more liquid instruments. We see that
the close connection between IG and HY bases is highly statistically signicant.
To further test the model's cross-sectional predictions, Panel B reports the following.
First, we estimate the slope of the cross-sectional required return-margin curve at each point
in time. Specically, each month, we regress the two bases on the IG and HY margin
dierences (0.2, 0.5):
basis




This produces an estimate of the slope at each time, that is, the return compensation per
unit of margin capital. (We get similar results if we include a constant term.) According to
the model, this margin-return slope captures the shadow cost of capital   (Propositions 4
and 9). Since the model also links   to interest-rate spreads, credit tightness, and risk
premia, we regress the estimated return-margin slope on such measures in Panel B. We see
that all the variables are statistically signicant in both levels and changes, and that their
explanatory power is large.
Testing the Model's Predictions for Liquidity Risk
The model predicts that when margin constraints are not binding, securities with the
similar fundamental risk should have similar volatilities and market betas, even if their
margin requirements are dierent. In times of (near-)binding constraints, however, securities
with high margin should have larger volatilities and betas as seen in Section 2.2. Indeed,
high-margin securities have more funding-liquidity risk because their large use of capital
makes them sensitive to changes in the tightness of capital constraints.
To test these model predictions on how margin requirements aect liquidity risk, Tables 4
and 5 consider the volatilities and market betas of CDSs and corporate bonds, both in the
early sample before the crisis (9/2005-6/2007), the crisis sample (7/2007-12/2009), and the
full sample. We estimate betas relative to the U.S. stock market as proxied by the S&P500
index, and we use the returns of CDX index and the Merrill Lynch intermediate corporate
return index in excess of the same-maturity swaps.
The model's predictions are born out in the data. Tables 4 and 5 show that CDS and
bonds indeed have similar volatilities and betas in the pre-crisis sample. If anything, corpo-
21rate bonds have slightly lower volatilities and betas. During the crisis sample, however, the
high-margin corporate bonds have much larger volatilities and betas than the low-margin
CDS. We see that this pattern is consistent across investment-grade and high-yield securities.
The volatilities are estimated with precision (the standard errors of these numbers are a few
percentage points) and the dierence between bonds and CDS is signicant (not reported
for brevity). The dierence between the bond and CDS betas is tested in Panel B of Table 5,
and we see that the dierence is signicant for IG securities.
3.2 Eects of Monetary Policy and Lending Facilities
The Federal Reserve has tried to alleviate the nancial sector's funding crisis by instituting
various lending facilities. These programs include the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF),
and several other programs.12 The TAF was instituted in December 2007 in response to
address the \pressures in short-term funding markets". With the TAF, the Fed auctions
collateralized loans to depository institutions at favorable margin requirements with 28-day
or 84-day maturity.
As the crisis escalated, the Fed announced on March 11, 2008 the TSLF, which oers
Treasury collateral to primary dealers in exchange for other program-eligible collateral such
as mortgage bonds and other investment grade securities for 28 days. Since this is an ex-
change of low-margin securities for higher-margin securities, it also improves the participating
nancial institutions' funding condition. By exchanging a mortgage bond for a Treasury and
then borrowing against the Treasury, the dealer eectively has its margin on mortgage bonds
reduced.
The Federal Reserve announced the additional creation of the TALF on November 25,
2008. The TALF issues non-recourse loans with term up to three years of eligible asset-backed
securities (ABS) backed by such things as student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and
loans relating to business equipment. The TALF is oered to a wide set of borrowers, not just
banks (but the borrowers must sign up with a primary dealer, which creates an additional
layer of frictions).
These programs share the feature that the Fed oers lower margins than what is otherwise
available in order to improve the funding of owners or buyers of various securities. This
improves the funding condition of the nancial sector and, importantly, makes the aected
securities more attractive than they would be otherwise. Indeed, the goal of the TALF is
to \help market participants meet the credit needs of households and small businesses by
supporting the issuance of asset-backed securities."13
In terms of our model, this can be understood as follows. The Fed oers a margin
mi;Fed for security i, say a student-loan ABS, which is lower than the prevailing margin,
12We thank Adam Ashcraft, Tobias Adrian, and participants in the Liquidity Working Group at the NY
Fed for helpful discussions on these programs.
13See http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf operations.html.
22mFed;i < mi. This lowers the required return of a derivative security:
E(r
i;Fed)   E(r
i;no Fed) = (m
Fed;i   m
i)  < 0: (33)
Said dierently, the Fed program increases the aected security's price (Proposition 5).
Hence, this ABS can be issued at an increased price, which makes the market more viable
since students can only pay a certain interest rate.
Ashcraft, G^ arleanu, and Pedersen (2010) provide survey evidence from nancial institu-
tions to see how their bid prices for various securities depend on the nancing that the Fed
would oer. The surveyed bid price increases as the Fed reduces its oered margin, consistent
with our model. For instance, the surveyed bid price of a super senior CMBS tranche with
an expected life of 7 years with no Fed nancing is $57, but increases to $92.5 with maturity
matched nancing with a low margin, a very large asset pricing eect. Similarly, the bid
price of a tranche with 2.5 years of expected life increases from $84 with no nancing to $92
with nancing with a low margin. This corresponds roughly to an annualized decrease in
expected return of 3.5%.
Let us consider this number in the context of our model. If the shadow cost of capital is
around 10% as implied by the IG and HY CDS-bond basis at the height of the liquidity crisis,
and CMBS tranches are derivatives only held by the risk-tolerant investor, then Equation (33)
implies an eect of 3.5% if the Fed improves the margin terms by 35 percentage points, so
the model-implied eect is in the right neighborhood.
Ashcraft, G^ arleanu, and Pedersen (2010) also provide evidence that the TALF lending
facility had an impact on the market prices of CMBS bonds in a way that is consistent with
our model.
3.3 Failure of the Covered Interest-Rate Parity (CIP) and the
Fed's Liquidity Swap Lines
While textbooks on international nance acknowledge the failure of the uncovered interest-
rate parity, the so-called covered interest-rate parity (CIP) is often taken to hold by denition
since arbitrage should enforce the Law of One Price. The covered interest rate parity says
that if the local interest rate is r, the foreign interest rate is r, the spot exchange rate is e,
and the forward exchange rate that can be locked in now is f, then 1+r = f=e(1+r). That
is, putting the money in the local bank earns 1+r which should be the same as exchanging a
dollar for 1=e units of foreign currency, earning 1+r abroad, and guaranteeing to exchange
the money back at the exchange rate of f to get f=e(1 + r).
This parity has nevertheless failed due to supply and demand imbalances in the forward
market and because it requires capital (margin) to trade to prot from deviations from
parity. To understand the background of this surprising eect, recall rst that the funding
problems of nancial institutions in the crisis of 2007-2009 quickly spread globally. Banks in
many countries had funding problems both in their local currency and in US dollars, perhaps
because many transactions are done in dollars.
To facilitate dollar funding for foreign banks, the Fed authorized temporary reciprocal
currency arrangements called \central bank liquidity swap lines" on December 12, 2007
23(Coey, Hrung, Nguyen, and Sarkar (2009)). Through these swap lines, the Fed lent dollars
to foreign central banks who in turn lent these dollars to their local banks.
Despite this eort, parity has been violated as a clear sign that the currency arbitrageurs'
margin requirements are binding as seen in Figure 7. The gure further shows that the time
series pattern of the deviation tracks the TED spread (i.e., the spread between LIBOR and
Treasury bills) in the 2007-2009 crisis and in liquidity crisis of 1998 (involving LTCM among
other events). This co-movement is highly statistically signicant both in levels and monthly
changes (regressions are not shown for brevity).
3.4 Quantifying the Cost of Capital Requirements: Incentives for
Regulatory Arbitrage
We can also use our model to quantify the shadow cost of Basel capital requirements in
order to help understand the banks' incentives to perform \regulatory arbitrage" by moving
assets o their balance sheet and tilting their portfolios towards AAA securities with low
regulatory capital requirements.
For this, we note that the Basel requirement has a similar form to the margin requirement.
It can loosely be captured by a similar equation to our model's margin requirement (see





ij  1; (34)
where i is the fraction of wealth in security i as before and mReg;i is the regulatory capital
requirement (8% times a risk weight under some rules).
When the prevailing margins are low, the regulatory requirement may be more binding
than the funding-based margin requirement. In this case, the margin mi in our pricing
formula is replaced by the regulatory requirement (34). Hence, a bank's required return
increases in the regulatory capital requirement multiplied by the shadow cost of capital,
 mReg;i. If the shadow cost of regulatory capital is 1% and a bank can move o balance
sheet an asset with risk weight of 100%, then its required return for that asset is reduced by
1%  8%  100% = 80 basis points.
4 Conclusion
We derive a tractable general-equilibrium asset-pricing model that accounts explicitly for the
pricing of margins. The model captures several of the salient features of the recent and past
liquidity crises: a negative fundamental shock leads to losses for leveraged agents, including
the nancial sector; these agents face funding problems as they hit margin constraints; the
binding constraints lead to drops in Treasury rates and general-collateral interest rates, to
spikes in interest-rate spreads, risk premia, and the pricing of margins, and to bases (or price
gaps) between securities with identical cash ows but dierent margins.
24We illustrate the model through a calibration, test it empirically using the CDS-bond
basis and the failure of the covered interest-rate parity, and show how the model-implied
cost of capital requirements quanties the banks' incentives to use o-balance sheet vehicles.
Finally, we estimate the eect of the Fed's lending facilities, which is helpful in evaluating
the unconventional monetary policy tools used during liquidity crises.
25Appendix
A Linear and Non-Linear Margin Constraints
We consider a non-linear margin requirement (7) that depends on the absolute value of the
position jij. Hence, both long (i > 0) and short (i < 0) positions make the constraint
tighter, i.e., both long and short positions use capital. It is interesting to compare this to a







u  1: (A.1)
While such a linear constraint is simpler to handle mathematically, it precludes the bases
that are central to our study:
Proposition 10 If agents face only linear margin requirements (A.1) and at least one
derivative exists with mi0 < mi, then any equilibrium is as if there were no margin con-
straints at all and there can be no deviations from the Law of One Price in equilibrium, that
is, the basis is always zero.
Proof of Proposition 10. For any asset allocations of the two agents, the linear margin
























This means that the linear margin constraint must be slack for at least one of the agents,
who is therefore not constrained at time t.
Suppose now that on a non-zero-measure set there fails to exist a market-price-of-risk





t for all securities j. Then
one of the two agents can trade on a non-zero-measure set to make risk-less strictly positive
(although bounded) prots | i.e., a zero-value portfolio  exists whose volatility is zero and
that has strictly positive drift. This contradicts the notion of equilibrium. Consequently, a
market-price-of-risk process exists. It follows, under technical integrability conditions, that
an equivalent martingale measure, dened by the stochastic exponential of this process, also
exists, so that assets with identical cashows have identical payos. (See Due (2001),
Chapter 6, Section G.)








she can relax her constraint by going long n shares of asset j and short n shares of asset i:
the trade has no cash-ows implications and makes the constraint slack. For n low enough,
the other agent's margin constraints remains slack due to (A.2), and therefore both agents
are unconstrained while their consumption processes remain the same. (Alternatively, we
can note that the CAPM relationship i
t   rc
t = g;j +  
g
tmi
t implies that  
g
t = 0 for both
agents g 2 fa;bg.)
26B Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1 and 4. These proofs are in the body of the paper.
Rather than oering a proof to the special Proposition 2, we state and prove its general
version. To this end, we dene the risk-tolerance fraction due to agent a by  xt = 1 xt. We
recall that   is agent b's shadow cost of funding, and we denote a's shadow cost of funding
by   . Finally, yi indicates whether b is long (yi
t = 1), short (yi
t =  1), or has no position
(yi
t 2 [ 1;1]) in an asset, and similarly  yi indicates the sign of a's position.
Proposition 20 (Margin CCAPM) The expected excess return i
t   rc
t on an underly-












where the funding cost is the product of the margin requirement and the margin premium:

m;i
t =  xt   t y
i
t + xt ty
i
t: (B.2)
Proof of Proposition 20. To understand the idea of the proof, suppose rst that agent a's
margin constraint never binds, so that he is (locally) unconstrained in his investment in the
underlying assets. Consequently, deating the gains process of any of these securities using
his marginal utility process yields a local martingale. Specically, agent a's marginal utility,

























































































which is equivalent to (14).
The general proof of this proposition involves characterizing the optimal portfolio choice
of an arbitrary agent with utility function u who faces convex portfolio constraints and
redundant assets. The steps are the following:
Step 1. Construct a family of ctitious economies in which there are no redundant
securities (derivatives) and where the drifts of asset prices and the (collateralized) interest








which are to be explained shortly. For ease of exposition, dene also  =  1( +    rc)








for all derivatives i0. Dening i0; analogously to i; would mean that there would be no
arbitrage opportunity in the ctitious market even if the redundant securities were traded.

















































    2 K
)
:
The function h() captures both the shadow value of capital and the increase to the interest
rate that an agent would have to be oered in a world without redundant securities in order
to achieve the same utility as when arbitrage opportunities are available to him. The rst
term in the last expression above represents the total additional return due to the higher
28drifts in the ctitious economy, while the second represents the arbitrage gains. Note that,
since K is bounded, h takes nite values on RN.
The ctitious economies are constructed so that any consumption feasible in the original,
constrained economy starting with a certain wealth is also feasible in each of these economies
| because available returns are at least as high. By including all such economies, it also
follows that there is one among them in which the optimal portfolio and consumption choices
satisfy the original constraints.
Step 2. For any consumption plan, the trading strategy figi that attains it at the highest
cost (initial wealth) among the optimal strategies in all ctitious economies is equivalent,
in terms of risk exposure, to a strategy
 
figi;fi0gi0
that nances the consumption plan
at the same cost and satises the constraints in the original economy. This is the new step
relative to the literature.
To prove this statement, follow Cvitani c and Karatzas (1993) to dene the maximum
















where E is the equivalent martingale measure in the market dened by , given by the





















is a supermartingale, so that it can be decomposed as
M












t an increasing process and w a Brownian motion. Comparing M with M0 identies































We claim that, since the right-hand side of (B.12) is increasing,  is equivalent to a strategy
 2 K. Indeed, suppose that this is not the case. The strategies in the original market that
are risk-equivalent to  are  = (^ ; ~ ) such that





29where ~  is the matrix of volatility vectors of the redundant securities. If the ane space 
consisting of all such  does not intersect the compact convex set K, then it is separated





for all  2  and K 2 K. Note that v is orthogonal to , i.e., v>(1   2) = 0 for all


































































































 R + D;
where jDj < 1 because K is bounded.
Thus, if  \ K = ;, h() + > can be made arbitrarily large, and consequently, the
left-, and therefore right-hand, side of (B.12) can be made decreasing, which would be a
contradiction.
Step 3. The optimal consumption in the original economy is therefore optimal in one of
the ctitious, unconstrained economies. Consequently, the marginal utility of the agent is















Step 4. For  that denes the constrained optimum, the optimal  attains the supremum
in the denition of h(). The characterization of  then comes down to a simple linear
optimization over a convex set.
30Suppose, for instance, that 1 > 0, which implies 1  0, and let   =   1
m1.14 If 2 > 0
and, say, 2
m2 >   , decreasing 2 by m1 and increasing 1 by m2 preserves the constraints
but increases the objective by

2
m2 +  

m1 > 0: Thus i





Cg;i +  m
i: (B.14)
All other cases are treated similarly. Note also that h() =  .















Therefore the treatment of the derivative is the same as that of any underlying asset as long
as the derivative position is not bound by a dierent constraint, which is entirely natural. If
the derivative positions are constrained by other constraints, then the form of the `shadow
returns' i0 is dierent. 
The next result is the general form of Proposition 3.
Proposition 30 [Margin CAPM]The expected excess return i
t   rc
t on an underlying




























t is a covariance risk premium and the margin premium
m;i is dened in Proposition 20.




































Multiplying this equation by qi
























14Remember K = fj
P
i jijmi  1g.
31Equations (B.16) and (B.17) immediately give the proposition. 






















where  is a Lagrange multiplier. (In the case of agent b, the HJB equation shows  to equal
(W) 1 .) The agent acts as if unconstrained, provided that  is chosen appropriately.
Suppose that the agent invests in  more shares of asset i, borrowing at the collateralized
rate to do so. The agent adjusts consumption to absorb both the dividends and interest
expense. Note that the only terms entering the constraint aected by this deviation are
jWsi

























































where ~ ys = 1 if i
s > 0, ~ ys =  1 if i
s < 0, and ~ ys = sign() if i = 0. Since the deviation






































where ys = 1 if i
s > 0, ys =  1 if i
s < 0, and ys 2 [ 1;1] if i











































The proposition follows from the fact that the right-hand side of the Equation (B.19) is
a monotonic function of yvmi
v for all v  t.
Proof of Proposition 6. We rst derive the dynamics of the state variable cb and the
consumption dynamics more generally. Then, we derive the dependence of the endogenous
variables on the state variables and the exogenous variables.
The dynamics of agent b's consumption Cb follows from Cb = W b and the dynamics for




c    + )dt + dwt) (B.20)
where   b is notation for the equilibrium volatility of agent b's wealth. Using this, the








2)dt + (   
C)dwt); (B.21)











c    + ))dt + C(
C   c
b)dwt: (B.23)
The interest rate is rc
t =  

t (as seen in (B.8) above) and thus applying Ito's Lemma to
the marginal utility  from (B.3) implies
r















1 + (a   1)cb:
The ordinary dierential equation (ODE) that characterizes the price-dividend ratio (cb)
follows from the fact that (B.6) is a local martingale with zero drift:
0 = 1 + 
 






























It remains to determine the values of , , and  as functions of  and its derivatives. For
this, we identify three equations for these three unknowns. First, the log-utility investor's















so that the optimal position is
 = min(;m
 1) =    (   m
 1)
+: (B.25)
Next, since agent a is unconstrained with respect to the market asset and general-








aC   cb + cb(   m 1)+
1   cb ;
where the second equality is due to the expression for the volatility of Ca in (B.23) and the
third to (B.25). It follows that
 =
a















33with  1 = ca (a)
 1 + cb as per (12) and   = C: Equation (B.26) provides a second
restriction on the three parameters that need to be calculated. The third restriction comes
from the fact that the volatility  of the price Pt = Ct(cb









To solve the system of three equations (B.25){(B.27),  can be eliminated right away to give
   m
















and note that the solution (;) given in the proposition is trivially true if   m 1,
which requires    m 1 . Suppose therefore that    m 1 > 0, leaving a linear system of
equations. This system can be written as
     =
1
1   cb(    m
 1) + m
 1    
=
cb
1   cb(    m
 1)
     =  
0cb

(    m
 1);
which gives (21) and (22) easily.
The boundary values for (cb) are its values at cb = 0 and cb = 1. These are the price-
dividend ratios in the single-agent economies in which either agent a or agent b has all the


















Finally, the value of the Lagrange multiplier   follows from the rst-order condition (9),
































Proof of Proposition 7. From Proposition 4,

i0
=  + 
C(
i0
  ) +  (m
i0
  m);



























i0 (   
C) + 
C:












where the dividend yield yi0 = y + i0    = y +  (mi0   m) and y is the market dividend
yield at cb = 0, i.e., y = (0) 1 from Equation (B.28).
Proof of Proposition 8. The limit price follows directly from Equation (B.28). The
limit value of   follows from (24), given that  = C (because the market price is C times a
constant price-dividend ratio in the limit) and  = aC, which is seen from (21) with x = 0
and  = a.
Proof of Proposition 9. Only the risk in C is priced. In the limit as cb ! 0, all
valuation ratios are constant, and therefore all covariances with the market equal (C)2, so
the result follows from Proposition 4 with equal betas.
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Figure 1: Collateralized and Uncollateralized Interest rates. This gures shows
how interest rates depend on the state of the economy as measured by cb the fraction of
consumption accruing to the risk tolerant investor. Low values of cb correspond to bad
states of the economy, and margin requirements bind for cb  0:22. The solid line represents
the collateralized interest rate rc (or Treasury rate), which drops sharply in bad times.
The dashed line represents the uncollateralized inter-bank interest rate ru. As a frictionless
benchmark, the dash-dot line represents the interest rate obtaining in an economy without
any constraints.




































Figure 2: Deviations from the Law of One Price (Basis). This gure shows the
dierence between the expected return of an underlying security and a derivative with the
same cash ows and a lower margin. This return spread is depicted as a function of the
state of the economy as measured by cb (where a low cb is a bad state of the economy). The
dotted line represents the return spread for a low-margin derivative mlow with a high margin
spread munderlying mlow = 30%, and the dashed line represents a medium-margin derivative
with a smaller margin spread of munderlying   mmedium = 10%.







































Underlying, high margin (m=40%)
Derivative, medium margin (m=30%)
Derivative, low margin (m=10%)
Figure 3: Sharpe Ratios (SR). The gure shows how the required SR depends on the
state of the economy as measured by cb (where a low cb is a bad state of the economy).
The solid line represents the SR of the underlying asset with a high margin, the dashed line
represents the SR of a derivative with identical cash ows and a medium margin, and the
dotted line that of a derivative with a low margin. As a frictionless benchmark, the dash-dot
line represents the SR obtaining in an economy without any constraints.


























Low constant margin, m=10%
Time−varying margin, m∈[10%,30%]
High constant margin, m=30%
Figure 4: Price Premium. The gure shows how the price premium above the price of the
underlying depends on the state of the economy as measured by cb (where a low cb is a bad
state of the economy). Each derivative has the same cash ows as the underlying, but a lower
margin requirement and, therefore, a larger price. The price premium, P derivative=P underlying 
1, is illustrated for a derivative with a low constant margin of 10%, one with a margin of 30%,
and one that has a margin that increases from 10% to 30% in a bad state of the economy
with cb < 0:15. The price premium is especially large for low margin securities during bad
economic times, but is non-trivial even before margin requirements bind (cb > 0:22) due to













































































































































































Figure 5: The CDS-Bond basis, the LIBOR-GC repo Spread, and Credit Stan-
dards. This gure shows the CDS-bond basis, computed as the yield spread for corporate
bonds minus the CDS spread (adjusted to account for certain dierences between CDS and
bonds), averaged across high grade bonds, as well as the spread between the 3-month uncol-
lateralized LIBOR loans and 3-month general collateral (GC) repo rate, and the net percent
of respondents tightening their credit standards in the Federal Reserve Board's \Senior Loan
Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices". Consistent with our model's predic-









































































































































































Figure 6: Investment Grade (IG) and High Yield (HY) CDS-Bond Bases, Ad-
justed for Their Margins. This gure shows the CDS-bond basis, computed as the yield
spread for corporate bonds minus the CDS spread (adjusted to account for certain dier-
ences between CDS and bonds), averaged across IG and HY bonds, respectively. Our model
predicts that the basis should line up in the cross section according to the margin dierences.
Since IG corporate bonds have a margin around 25% and IG CDS have margins around 5%,
the IG margin dierential is 20%. Hence, the adjusted IG basis is basis/0.20. Similarly,
we estimate that the HY margin dierential is around 50% so the HY adjusted basis is ba-
sis/0.50. We adjust the level of each series by subtracting the average during the rst two
years 2005-2006 when credit was easy so margin eects played a small role. Consistent with
the idea that the expected prot per margin use is constant in the cross section, we see that


































































































































































































































































CIP deviation TED spread (right axis)
Figure 7: Average Deviation from Covered-Interest Parity and the TED Spread.
This gure shows the average absolute deviation from the covered interest rate parity for the
Euro, Yen, and British Pound, as well as the TED spread, which is the 3-month uncollater-
alized LIBOR rate minus the 3-month T-bill rate. The magnitude of the deviation from the
CIP tracks the TED spread in the time series consistent with the model's prediction that
the shadow cost of funding liquidity due to binding margins drive both eects.
46Table 2: Time-Series Relation Between CDS-Bond Basis and Measures on Liq-
uidity and Risk Premia. The table reports univariate regressions of the CDS-bond basis
on, respectively, the TED-spread (proxying for funding illiquidity) and the dividend yield of
U.S. stocks as reported by MSCI (proxying for risk premia), monthly from 2005 to 2009, and
the tightening credit standards from Federal Reserve Board's survey, which is available quar-
ter. We run these regressions separately for the average basis among investment-grade and
high-yield bonds, and separately for the levels of these variables (Panel A) and the monthly
changes of the variables (Panel B), except the credit standards which is run quarterly. To ac-
count for the potential bias due to stale prices in the monthly regression of changes, we include
a lagged value of the explanatory variable (Dimson (1979)), basist = +1xt +2xt 1 +"t.
We report the bias-corrected estimate, 1+2. The coecient of the intercept is not reported.
Panel A: Regressions in Levels. Dependent Variable: CDS-Bond Basis. 
coefficient t-statistic R2 coefficient t-statistic R2
TED spread 0.54 4.62 26% 0.86 3.78 19%
Credit standards 0.02 13.60 75% 0.03 11.11 67%
Dividend yield 1.62 21.03 88% 2.95 17.34 83%
Investment Grade High Yield
Panel B: Regressions in Changes. Dependent Variable: CDS-Bond Basis. 
coefficient t-statistic R2 coefficient t-statistic R2
TED spread 0.42 4.35 42% 0.72 4.32 33%
Credit standards 0.02 4.12 47% 0.03 3.17 35%
Dividend yield 1.06 3.83 23% 2.37 5.99 39%
Investment Grade High Yield
47Table 3: Cross-Sectional Relation Between IG and HY Bases. Panel A reports the
regression of the high-yield (HY) CDS-bond basis on the investment-grade (IG) CDS-bond
basis. We note that the IG securities is more liquid, and, to account for the potential eect
of stale prices in the regression of changes, we include a lagged value of the explanatory
variable (Dimson (1979)), basisHY
t =  + 1basisIG
t + 2basisIG
t 1 + "t. We report the bias-
corrected estimate, . In Panel B, we rst estimate the slope of the cross-sectional required
return-margin relation at any time. We do this by regressing the two bases on the two
corresponding margin dierences (0.20, 0.50). We then regress this slope (which measures
funding illiquidity according to the model) on the three explanatory variables described in
Table 2.
Panel A: Regressing the high-yield basis on the investment-grade basis. 
coefficient t-statistic R2
Levels
IG basis, levels 1.79 25.53 91%
Changes
IG basis, changes 1.42 8.27 64%
Panel B: Regressing the slope of the margin-return curve on explanatory variables. 
coefficient t-statistic R2
Levels
TED spread 1.86 3.95 20%
Credit standards 0.07 11.71 69%
Dividend yield 6.19 18.61 85%
Changes
TED spread 1.53 4.54 37%
Credit standards 0.07 3.39 38%
Dividend yield 4.81 5.78 38%
48Table 4: Volatility of CDS vs. Bonds. The table shows the annualized return volatility
of CDS and bonds estimated over, respectively, the early pre-crisis sample (9/2005-6/2007),
the crisis sample (7/2007-12/2009), and the full sample. The table reports this separately for
investment-grade and high-yield securities. In both cases, CDS and bonds are about equally
volatile in the early sample, but bonds are more volatile during the crisis, consistent with
the model's predictions that high-margin bonds have more funding liquidity risk.
CDS Bonds CDS Bonds
Early sample 0.57% 0.51% 3.73% 2.76%
Crisis 3.92% 10.26% 17.19% 20.87%
Full sample 3.02% 7.83% 13.31% 16.01%
Investment Grade High Yield
49Table 5: Betas of CDS vs. Bonds. Panel A shows the market betas of CDS and
bond returns estimated over, respectively, the early pre-crisis sample (9/2005-6/2007), the
crisis sample (7/2007-12/2009), and the full sample. The table reports this separately for
investment-grade and high-yield securities. In both cases, bonds have slightly lower betas in
the early sample, but bonds have larger betas during the crisis, consistent with the model's
predictions that high-margin bonds have more funding liquidity risk. Panel B shows the
statistical signicance of the dierence between CDS and bonds using a panel regression.
Panel A: Betas estimated separately for CDS on Bonds 
CDS Bonds CDS Bonds
Early sample 0.05 -0.01 0.35 0.22
    (stand. err.) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08)
Crisis 0.13 0.29 0.56 0.73
    (stand. err.) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
Full sample 0.12 0.26 0.54 0.69
    (stand. err.) (0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
Investment Grade High Yield
Panel B: Panel regression with CDS and bonds 
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